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Feeling Fit for Function: Haptic 
Touch and Aesthetic Experience
Tom Roberts 
Traditionally, the sense of touch—alongside the senses of taste and smell—has been excluded from 
the aesthetic domain. These proximal modalities are thought to deliver only sensory pleasures, not 
the complex, world-directed perceptual states that characterize aesthetic experience. In this paper, 
I argue that this tradition fails to recognize the perceptual possibilities of haptic touch, which allows 
us to experience properties of the objects with which we make bodily contact, including their weight, 
shape, solidity, elasticity, and smoothness. These features, moreover, may be indicative of how well-
suited an object is for its function, and in feeling them we can thus feel the positive aesthetic quality 
of functional beauty.
1. Introduction
Which of our sensory modalities are capable of delivering distinctively aesthetic experi-
ences? A  traditional answer is to defend the possibility of aesthetic experience for the 
distal senses of vision and audition while excluding the proximal senses of taste, smell, 
and touch.1 The distal senses have aesthetic credentials, the thinking goes, because they 
inform us of complex, public objects, in contrast to the private and rudimentary pleasures 
of mere internal sensation. Admitting the proximal senses to the aesthetic domain would 
‘obliterate’ a distinction that is both long-standing and firmly marked in linguistic usage 
between genuinely appreciative experiences such as regarding a painting or listening to 
music on the one hand, and the simple enjoyment of ‘taking a bath’ or ‘drinking lem-
onade’ on the other (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 178). It is only to the former class of 
perceptual encounters, facilitated by the ‘higher’ distal senses, that aesthetic attributions 
such as beautiful are warranted, while experiences of the latter sort, derived from the 
‘lower’ proximal senses, deserve only to be called agreeable or pleasing.
In this paper, my concern is with the sense of touch. I will argue that those who have 
been unwilling to countenance aesthetic experiences in this modality have failed to ac-
knowledge its perceptual potential. Touch has a two-dimensional character. On the one 
hand, it can involve relatively simple sensations felt on or within the boundary of the skin, 
such as feelings of warmth, cold, tingling, or prickling. On the other hand, however, 
touch is capable of delivering richly exteroceptive experiences: that is, experiences of 
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1 Plato, Greater Hippias; Burke (1757/1958); Parsons and Carlson (2008); Scruton (1979). For recent dissent, see 
e.g. Korsmeyer (1999) on taste; Shiner and Kristovets (2007), Shiner (2020), and Brady (2005) on olfaction; 
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objects and features that are external to the body.2 It is this second dimension, known as 
haptic touch, that will be my central focus in what follows. An embodied subject deploys 
haptic touch when, for instance, they lift and grip an object; squeeze, swing, or flex it in 
the hands; or run their fingers over its surface. Dynamic and exploratory activities such 
as these enable the perception of an array of properties that belong to material objects, 
such as rigidity, elasticity, weight, balance, solidity, tension, pliability, and smoothness.
Furthermore, these are properties that can determine how well an object is formed for 
its function—including, for example, how well-suited it is for manual manipulation; for 
wielding, striking, or pulling; for cutting and slicing; for riding upon or driving in; and 
for performing activities such as throwing, writing, eating, knitting, or running. If we 
permit that the appearance of being well-formed for a particular function is a positive aes-
thetic quality—as those who promote the idea of functional beauty have so far defended 
for the visual attributes of an object3—then we ought also to accept the sense of touch 
into the aesthetic domain, for this modality allows us to feel this species of positive aes-
thetic quality. When we weigh in our hand the perfect snowball, ride a well-engineered 
and well-oiled bicycle, wield a clean-flowing fountain pen, or test the bounce of our new 
sports shoes, we can derive aesthetic satisfaction from the fact that the item has been 
manifestly well-formed for its function.
In Section 2, I briefly rehearse the reasons why aesthetic credentials have been denied 
to the modality of touch. In Section 3, I summarize recent work on the nature and per-
ception of functional beauty, and highlight the visuo-centric thinking that runs through 
this literature. In Section 4, I show how the sense of touch, too, can give rise to perceptual 
experiences of functional beauty.
2. Touch and Aesthetic Experience
Why have commentators tended to exclude the proximal senses from the aesthetic do-
main? Historically, the reasons are several;4 but we can capture much of the terrain by 
considering three principal lines of argument.
Firstly, the sensory deliverances of smell, taste, and touch have been thought to lack 
the formal complexity that characterizes paradigmatic objects of aesthetic experience.5 
For touch, it is basic and undifferentiated bodily sensations such as a feeling of warmth 
on the skin that are thought to have limited internal structure. They have no interesting 
parts whose relations might yield an experience of balance, harmony, or tension, for 
2 Montero (2006) defends the aesthetic character of interoceptive sensations of proprioception—the awareness, 
from the inside, of the posture and movement of one’s own body. The role of touch in aesthetic encounters with 
genuine historic artefacts is explored in Korsmeyer (2019b).
3 Parsons and Carlson (2008); Paris (2020); Sauchelli (2013).
4 For detailed treatments of this history, see Parsons and Carlson (2008, pp. 177–189) who are sympathetic to the 
traditional view, and Korsmeyer (1999, pp. 11–37; 2019a) who is critical of it.
5 E.g. Soucek (2009); Zink (1942, p. 709). See Coleman (1965, p. 321) for a critical discussion. In her defence of 
the aesthetic character of the experience of itching and scratching, Irvin (2008) concedes the formal-complexity 
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instance. Nor do they have a temporal ebb and flow with, say, a satisfying resolution. And 
whereas even flavours and odours might be mixed, blended, and engineered—by a chef 
or a perfumier, for example—so as to afford a certain qualitative sophistication,6 there 
are fewer opportunities to enrich what we feel in the body. Like a visual experience that 
presents only brute colour, simple somatic sensations thus do not reward our attentive en-
gagement and contemplation—there is nothing, as it were, to get our aesthetic teeth into.
Secondly, a challenge arises from the private nature of proximal-sensory states.7 For 
touch, the worry is that tactile sensations are localized within, or at the limits of, an 
individual subject’s body. Because they have no public object that others can access by 
the same means, these interoceptive experiences cannot be shared, and so they are not 
available for intersubjective scrutiny, discussion, and disagreement—unlike the standard 
objects of aesthetic appreciation. There is, as Dowling (2010, p. 239) has put it, nothing 
in the world to anchor whatever felt qualities are reported by the subject of bodily sensa-
tions in the way that the material features of a sculpture, for example, provide a mind-
independent ground for our aesthetic attributions in the visual domain. Finally, fleeting 
sensations at the periphery of the body may be too elusive for the subject herself to grasp 
and articulate, even if the vocabulary were there to do so, and are thus destined to remain 
private and undisclosed.
Thirdly, there is the argument from linguistic conservativism, which holds that ex-
panding the term ‘aesthetic’ to encompass experiences derived from the proximal 
senses would do an injustice to the well-entrenched ways in which this concept is de-
ployed in our discourse. To bestow bodily sensations with aesthetic credentials, that is, 
is to be excessively permissive: ‘the pleasures of exercising, taking a bath, drinking lem-
onade, or engaging in sexual activity may all count... as aesthetic pleasures’ (Parsons 
and Carlson, 2008, p. 178). But established linguistic usage has—‘since ancient times’ 
(2008, p. 185)—carved out a distinction between aesthetic and merely sensuous gratifi-
cation that acknowledges a fundamental phenomenological difference between these two 
categories. Any attempt to dissolve this distinction both disregards tradition and runs 
the risk of trivializing the very concept of the aesthetic (Forsey, 2013, p. 211; Dowling, 
2010, p. 226). According to this argument, even relatively non-committal evaluative de-
scriptions such as ‘aesthetically pleasing’, which fall short of such full-blown accolades 
as ‘beautiful’, ‘sublime’, or ‘exquisite’, are strained and unnatural when ascribed to the 
proximal senses (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 180). Where language like this is used 
to describe the objects of the proximal modalities—as it sometimes is for, say, tempting 
foodstuffs or fine whisky (Davies, 2010, p. 325)—it should be regarded as non-literal. 
Strictly speaking, we should apply our aesthetic terminology only where it belongs: to 
what we see and what we hear.
In combination, these three arguments appear to put significant pressure on the idea 
that the sense of touch, alongside the senses of taste and smell, is capable of generating 
distinctively aesthetic experience. In Section 4, however, I will argue that they rest upon 
6 See, e.g., Shiner (2015, 2020), Korsmeyer (2019a, pp. 362–3).
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an impoverished conception of the content and character of this modality, because touch 
does not only let us feel sensations internal to the body, it enables us to make haptic-
perceptual contact with material features of the extra-mental environment. Once we 
recognize this, we can see that touch allows us to feel the positive aesthetic qualities that 
stem from the relation between an object’s form and its function.
3. Functional Beauty
Before turning to the perceptual possibilities of the sense of touch, I will unpack the re-
lations between form, function, and aesthetics as they have been understood in recent 
literature, drawing especially on Parsons and Carlson’s influential treatment, Functional 
Beauty (2008). Put simply, this species of beauty is a positive aesthetic quality, the appre-
ciation of which is ‘cognitively rich’, in that it requires knowledge of the function of the 
bearer of that quality. To see a sports car as functionally beautiful, for example, one must 
know that it is a vehicle with the function of driving at high speed (Parsons and Carlson, 
2008, p. 96). More precisely, following Walton (1970), knowledge of function allows one 
to assign the object to an appropriate category and to apprehend its features in terms of 
those properties that are standard, contra-standard, and variable for that category. A ve-
hicle with only those properties that are standard for a car may appear unremarkable—or 
perhaps sleek and unfussy—while a vehicle with, say, contra-standardly large wheels has 
parts that may look dissonant or unbalanced (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, pp. 93–96). 
The sports car appears well-suited for its function when it is perceived as having ‘no 
contra-standard features at all and as having, to a high degree, certain variable features 
that are indicative of functionality’, such as a spoiler and outsized engine that are indica-
tive of speed (2008, p. 96). In virtue of these features, the car has ‘that certain pleasing 
visual quality that we call “looking fit”’ (2008).
While looking fit is the fundamental species of functional beauty, it is not the only one 
to be derived from the Waltonian framework. For example, an object that is seen to 
manifest only standard features for its kind is likely to be regarded as having ‘simplicity, 
gracefulness, or elegance’ (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 96), or to appear streamlined, 
clean, or restrained for an object of its type. Minimalist design, for instance, prizes those 
objects that are stripped back to their essentials with an unembellished economy of form. 
Once again, knowledge of the category to which an item belongs makes these sorts of 
aesthetic attributions possible: an object with a glass door and a discreet set of burners 
may appear elegant when viewed under one description (‘stove’) but not under another 
(‘safe’) because the standard features for objects in each category are different (2008, 
pp. 97–98). Rather than being distinct from the basic property of looking fit, qualities 
such as elegance, cleanliness, or restraint might, in cases like these, be regarded as ways 
in which an object looks fit for its function. Either way, the Waltonian model bears fruit 
in taxonomizing functional beauty.
Lastly, Parsons and Carlson argue that contra-standard features of an object may be 
aesthetically significant when they have a pleasingly unexpected or incongruous effect. 
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tension’ (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 99), when it seems from a distance to lack the 
structural integrity required for moving heavy loads. Here, the standard-for-cranes prop-
erty of sturdiness appears to be missing, giving rise to an intriguing sense of disharmony.
The concept of functional beauty, then, is a productive and informative one. The core 
idea—that being manifestly well-formed for a certain function is sufficient for an object 
to have aesthetic appeal—helps us to understand an important range of positive aesthetic 
qualities found in a wide variety of designed artefacts, tools, and furniture; in architec-
ture; and in the natural and built environment (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, Chapters 
5–7). Paris (2020, p.  521) amends Parsons and Carlson’s analysis by adding a further 
condition: that an object is functionally beautiful when its well-formedness for its func-
tion is apt to please a majority of competent judges. This revision is attractive because it 
allows us to set a higher bar on functional beauty and so avoid having to attribute it too 
widely—for instance, to functional but aesthetically indifferent objects like pencils or 
garbage trucks (Paris, 2020, p. 520) or to the unkempt but well-adapted snout of a pig 
(Burke, 1757/1958; Parsons and Carlson, 2008, pp.  12–18). Everything that follows, 
however, is consistent with the acceptance or the rejection of this extra condition.
In existing scholarship, functional beauty has been defended as an exclusively visual 
concept. As we saw in Section 2, Parsons and Carlson are among those who strongly re-
pudiate any expansion of the aesthetic beyond the distal modalities of sight and hearing, 
and this applies equally to the functionally aesthetic. Functional beauty is only ever some-
thing that we see, it is available in the look of an object; the qualities whose standard, vari-
able, or contra-standard character is of aesthetic significance are visual qualities. Other 
proponents of functional beauty share this visuo-centric attitude. Panos Paris (2020, 
p. 522), for instance, is keen to avoid the ‘worry’ that his analysis might entail the exist-
ence of tactile beauty, and argues that the way to block this implication is by recognizing 
that touch only delivers simple and formally uncomplicated bodily sensations. Stephen 
Davies (2006, p. 234) distinguishes attributions of functional beauty from those of mere 
functional goodness or efficiency, and illustrates the latter by appeal to a knife that cuts 
well—suggesting that, in his view, tactile interaction with an object is unlikely to yield 
aesthetic experience proper. He allows, however, that a visual judgement of functional 
beauty may be overturned if the other senses reveal that an object is poorly formed for 
its function—as when a stylish and graceful-looking chair turns out to be awkward and 
uncomfortable to sit on (p. 237). Andrea Sauchelli (2013, p. 46), although he does not ex-
plicitly rule out the possibility of proximally sensed functional beauty, focuses entirely on 
visual cases, to the extent that the functional beauty even of a football shoe is to be under-
stood in terms of the look of its shape. A consequence of this visuo-centric emphasis, of 
course, is that it precludes persons who cannot see an object from partaking in the beauty 
that derives from its function. It is worth exploring ways to avoid this conclusion, as it 
places unfortunate restrictions on the aesthetic capabilities of those who are blind or par-
tially sighted.
In the next section, I explain why we should not think of tactile perception as being a 
matter of simple, undifferentiated, private, and internal sensation. By understanding the 
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beauty that is felt, not seen. And we can do so without threatening a collapse of the trad-
itional distinction between aesthetic and sensuous pleasure.
4. Haptic Touch and Functional Beauty
The sense of touch has a number of experiential dimensions: it involves a sensitivity to 
pressure, hardness, texture, warmth and cold, and it gives rise to bodily sensations such 
as tingling, itching, and burning. This complexity has led some commentators to think 
of touch as comprising several distinct sensory channels,8 and we should acknowledge, at 
least, that touch-like bodily experiences exhibit a diversity of forms. There are those that 
are not connected to sensory input from the world beyond the skin and have no readily 
identifiable intentional content, such as a spontaneous feeling of pins-and-needles on the 
back of the knee. There are those that involve a passive receptivity to cutaneous stimula-
tion, such as the feeling of a fly landing on one’s arm, or of the heat from a nearby radiator. 
Of greater interest for current purposes, moreover, are those experiences that derive 
from active bodily engagement with external things—when we use, for example, the fin-
gers and hands to explore the material constituents of our surroundings. By bringing our 
body into contact with objects and surfaces, we uncover what is out there in the world: 
what has edges and corners, what is solid and immobile, what is soft, smooth, pliable, 
sticky, heavy, or abrasive.
This exteroceptive character is well-attested in psychological literature (e.g. Lederman 
and Klatsky, 1987, 2009; Turvey, 1996) and is a central component of recent philosoph-
ical analyses of the sense of touch (e.g. Fulkerson, 2011, 2014; Mattens, 2017; Ratcliffe, 
2008, 2012; Richardson, 2013). To the extent that there is disagreement here at all, it 
concerns what is sometimes called the bipolar nature of touch (e.g. Scott, 2001, p. 149): 
the fact that it involves both bodily sensations and an awareness of the world outside of 
the skin. There are alternative treatments of how these two elements fit together. On 
Richardson’s (2013) ‘simple view’, for example, the world-directed character of touch is 
already captured within many of our tactile sensations, a complete articulation of which 
must make ineliminable reference to the external object that appears to be in contact 
with part of the body. This is to say that the sensations must themselves be characterized 
relationally (2013, p. 142) as feelings of one’s body being in touch with something that lies 
beyond the skin. Pressing our hand against a table, for example, gives rise to a feeling 
whose conscious character cannot be individuated except by appeal to the table, its prop-
erties, and the pressure it exerts upon the active body (2013, pp. 142–143). The feeling 
is not simply a sensation in the hand, but a state that represents the presence of a material 
thing located at the hand’s boundary, with qualities such as density, warmth, and texture. 
A similar perspective is developed by Brogaard (2012, pp. 18–19), who argues that the 
hardness of a rock held in the palm can be felt in virtue of the sensations of pressure it 
generates on the skin.
8 E.g. Aristotle (DA, II.11); Loomis and Lederman (1986). For discussion see Fulkerson (2011). Ratcliffe (2012) 
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Other accounts place additional emphasis on the diachronic and dynamic character 
of touch, and the skilled exploratory probing that reveals the tactile world to us (Noë, 
2004; O’Shaughnessy, 2000). We encounter an object by ‘picking it up, rolling it around 
in the hands, squeezing it, ... pressing against it ... tracing its outline’ (Fulkerson, 2011, 
p.  508), and we perceive the object’s shape and form as these behaviours unfold over 
time. For Noë (2004, 2009), there is more to the content of a tactile experience than that 
which is included in any momentary conscious sensation. Holding a beachball between 
the outstretched fingers of both hands, for example, yields an occurrent sensation at the 
tip of each digit. But our implicit, embodied knowledge of how to access the rest of the 
beachball through exploratory movement (our mastery of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’) 
gives us an awareness of its surface extending beyond the parts with which we are in im-
mediate contact, as well as of its voluminous spherical shape.
These active forms of touch require the agent to have a sense of where her body is 
and what her body is doing, and so to keep track of kinaesthetic and proprioceptive in-
formation.9 Following convention (e.g. Fulkerson, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2012), let us reserve 
the term haptic touch for this complex kind of sensory perception; the form of touch that 
comprises exploratory, active bodily contact with the material world. Haptic touch can 
be distinguished from the tactile awareness of mere bodily sensations such as prickling, 
stinging, or throbbing in virtue of its richer content. Haptic experiences give us percep-
tual access to the material qualities of ordinary things.
If we accept this distinction, then it should be evident that any assessment of the aes-
thetic credentials of touch ought not to be restricted to the most basic deliverances of 
this modality—simple interoceptive sensations—but must also give due weight to its 
world-directed nature. If the material qualities of an object perceived through haptic 
touch are aesthetically significant, formally complex, and publicly accessible, then we 
may have the resources to resist the traditional view that this sense does not belong to the 
aesthetic domain.
Now consider the haptic perception of functional objects such as furniture, tools, ve-
hicles, kitchenware, musical instruments, or sporting equipment. These are, paradigmat-
ically, items with which we engage by bodily means. They are lifted, swung, gripped, 
twisted, pulled, and otherwise manipulated by hand, and we sit, stand, ride, and lie down 
on them. When we do so, certain of their qualities show up in haptic experience. There 
are intrinsic features such as density and hardness, shape and texture. There are proper-
ties associated with movement, including being stable, cumbersome, or finely balanced. 
There are mechanical qualities such as stiffness, tension, or freedom from friction.10 
Do features like these give rise to a kind of functional beauty that can be perceived via 
haptic touch?
I suggest so. As we will see, applying the Waltonian framework enables us to make 
sense of what it takes for an object to feel functionally beautiful when it has a particular 
9 Kinaesthesia is the sense of the movement of one’s body; proprioception is the sense of the position and posture 
of one’s body.
10 These categories are not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive—they simply give a sense of the range of features 
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suite of haptically accessible standard, variable, and contra-standard properties. Some 
preliminary remarks are in order before we get to illustrative examples. Firstly, notice 
that many physical properties can be both felt and seen. An object’s size and shape, the 
ways in which its parts are organized, and its spatial orientation are often available to sight 
and touch. There is an additional class of material features that are not directly accessible 
to vision but which can be perceived haptically, such as an object’s weight, solidity, soft-
ness, or elasticity. This latter class of properties, no less than the former, can determine 
whether an object is capable of performing its function well. A light, flexible sabre is more 
effective than a heavy, clunky one; a taut, springy running shoe outperforms one with an 
unforgiving sole; a firm but supple paintbrush does a better job than one whose bristles 
are frail or unyielding.
We should also observe the distinction between using a functional object and testing 
it. On the one hand, an agent can haptically perceive an item in the course of pursuing 
some end: wielding the sabre as a weapon, sprinting in the shoes, or colouring a canvas 
with the brush. On the other hand, the subject can probe and explore the object without 
putting it to practical use in order to get a sense of how it is constituted: flexing a shoe 
between the hands, or giving the sabre an experimental swipe or two. This is significant 
because it allows us to forestall the worry that haptic engagement with a functional item 
can tell us only how well that item is working—a matter of efficiency or performance 
that might be thought to fall short of aesthetic evaluation. When we test an object through 
haptic exploration, we become attentive to properties of its form that are indicative of its 
functionality, and we do so from something approaching the standpoint of a disinterested 
observer. Active touch reveals how the object is put together, how its parts interlink, how 
its mechanisms operate, and how well these combine in the service of its function. There 
is thus a mode of haptic perception that is closer to traditional notions of the aesthetic, 
enabling the perceiver to take pleasure in the unity of form and function.
Now we are in a position to articulate the haptic equivalent of looking fit. An object feels 
fit for its function when it is perceived through touch as having no contra-standard proper-
ties for an object of its type, and as having variable properties, all of which are indicative 
of a high degree of functionality. Suppose that on a crisp winter’s night, you construct 
the perfect snowball: a faultless sphere that fits neatly in the palm, with just enough heft 
and texture for throwing without risk of injury to its victim. Not being unusually large 
or small, and lacking any embellishment of form, the snowball has no contra-standard 
features. Its variable features are all indicative of how effectively the snowball could be 
propelled with force and accuracy towards an adversary. As you roll it idly in your hand, 
it has a pleasing haptic quality that we can call ‘feeling fit for function’.11
11 Saito (2001, p. 92) argues that ‘the aesthetic value of a knife consists not only of its visual qualities and its feel in 
my hand, determined by its surface texture, weight, and balance but, most importantly, by how smoothly and 
effortlessly I can cut an object with it’. Parsons and Carlson (2008, p. 190) state that, in Saito’s description of 
the beauty of the knife, ‘functionality ... is not viewed as an integral component of aesthetic value, but only as a 
happy source of additional bodily pleasures ... smooth movements of the limbs, pleasing tactile sensations, and 
so on’. If we concur, we can regard the proposal of the current paper as giving proper emphasis to functionality 
in cases like Saito’s. If we think that function is already integral to Saito’s analysis, we can regard the current 
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A similar experience is enjoyed by one who, for example, inspects a classic Bianchi 
racing bicycle. Although its clean lines, low-slung handlebars, and narrow tyres can con-
tribute to its looking highly fit for its function, our appreciation of the beauty of the bicycle 
is not restricted to the visual. Firstly, these same spatial and organizational properties are 
equally accessible to haptic perception: the dimensions and orientation of the bicycle’s 
parts can be revealed by running one’s hands over its fabric only marginally less easily 
than they can be seen. And there is, secondly, a range of functionally relevant material 
qualities that are available to haptic touch alone. These include the lightness and flexibility 
of the steel frame and the firm bounce of the tyres, plus mechanical properties such as 
the free-flowing ease with which the chain runs through the derailleur and the friction-
less operation of the gears. The bicycle feels fit for its function when qualities like these 
are disclosed through haptic exploration, even though they are contributors to functional 
beauty that remain inaccessible to vision.
We can also make sense of how Parsons and Carlson’s second category of functional 
beauty—that which arises when an object manifests only standard features for its type—
might be perceived through haptic touch. An artefact can feel streamlined, unfussy, 
or economical when it is taken in the hands and explored. Items of highly engineered 
consumer electronics, for example, fit this model. A mobile telephone with a compact, 
ergonomic form can be perceptibly free from unnecessary adornment—with a polished 
surface and uninterrupted contours. Its sleek frame has a certain pleasing elegance and 
simplicity that can be revealed to the touch. The same is true for sports equipment or kit-
chenware items, and for household objects such as cigarette lighters or stationery.
The third species of functional beauty identified by Parsons and Carlson can show up in 
the haptic domain as well. This quality is exemplified by an object that, while it appears 
able to fulfil its function, has contra-standard properties that strike the observer as ‘at 
odds’ with that functionality, generating a pleasing contradiction or dissonance (Parsons 
and Carlson, 2008, p. 99). Suppose that you encounter a large and imposing hardwood 
door, taller and wider than you are. When you apply pressure to the door, you discover 
that it glides open without effort—despite its bulk, it moves freely, perhaps due to a 
hidden counterweight.12 The effect, I  suggest, is a gratifying sense of the apparent un-
wieldiness of the object being confounded by the unexpected ease with which it performs 
its function. If the expansive surface of the door has been given to you visually, then this 
pleasing result lies in a cross-modal contrast between what is seen and what is felt. But 
we can also conceive of a scenario in which both the well-functioning of the door and its 
contra-standard, outsized dimensions are grasped in haptic perception; in which case, 
the arresting experience of discrepancy belongs to this single modality. It is not hard to 
imagine a similar dissonance arising when a functional object is, for instance, unusually 
small (as with tiny portable versions of tools, say) or unusually light (as with a traditional 
artefact made from modern materials).
These three varieties of functional beauty are accessible to a person who is blind or 
partially sighted, or one whose eyes are closed. They are perceived when a subject who 
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is knowledgeable about an object’s function comes to feel that object’s form, and to ap-
prehend how its material character contributes positively to that function. Felt qualities 
such as hardness, flexibility, weight, and manoeuvrability are no less capable of grounding 
attributions of functional beauty than the visual characteristics that have been the focus of 
existing treatments of this phenomenon.13 We can thus assign aesthetic credentials to the 
modality of haptic touch.
Three arguments against permitting this proximal sense into the aesthetic domain were 
outlined in Section 2, and we can now respond to these considerations in greater detail. The 
first proposition was that tactile sensations, alongside simple smells and tastes, lack sufficient 
formal or structural complexity to be accorded aesthetic status—they are just not rich or 
interesting enough to form the foundation for aesthetic judgement. While this may be true 
for bodily feelings that possess a purely interoceptive character, a focus on haptic experi-
ence reveals how an agent may perceive rather substantial features of functional objects, 
including how their parts are organized, how their edges and surfaces extend, how they 
deform under pressure, how they move, and how their mechanisms operate. An episode of 
exploratory touch can disclose the complex character of an artefact: what its properties are 
like relative to others of its kind, and how well those properties combine in the service of 
its function. While these perceptual contents are, perhaps, more rudimentary than those of 
our most elaborate visual experiences, there is little reason to bracket them alongside very 
basic proximal-sensory qualities and to regard them as mere bodily sensations.
Similarly, haptic experiences are anchored in a public object—the material entity with 
which a perceiver’s body makes contact—and this allows us to resist the complaint that 
touch is essentially an inner, private sense. An item can be passed from one person to 
another, and each can share the experience of that object’s functional beauty, provided 
that they have the knowledge to assign it to its appropriate category. A musician can in-
vite a bandmate to appreciate the lightweight but robust construction of his new guitar 
and the lively tension of its strings; a carpenter can allow her apprentice to feel how deli-
cately a cabinet door turns on its hinges; and two writers can both appreciate an elegantly 
weighted, clean-flowing fountain pen. The individual experiences may not happen con-
temporaneously, but this is no more problematic than the fact that two people might view 
the same painting at different times.14 The public nature of haptically perceived functional 
beauty opens it up to the intersubjective scrutiny, debate, and disagreement that we ex-
pect to see with aesthetic phenomena. Especially among connoisseurs of some category, 
such as cycling enthusiasts or players in an orchestra, there may be quite finely grained 
disputes over which of two objects feels more functionally beautiful, which feels more 
graceful, which gives rise to the most intriguing feeling of dissonance, and so forth.
Lastly, there is the argument that using aesthetic language to describe the sense of touch 
does an injustice to how such vocabulary has been traditionally employed, and may lead to 
a dissolution of the distinction between the aesthetic and the merely pleasurable. Neither 
13 In fact, an object may feel functionally beautiful while failing to look functionally beautiful. For example, with 
an elderly, scruffy object that nonetheless retains felt qualities that are indicative of its well-functioning, such as 
items of vintage cookware.
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side of this objection need trouble the proponent of haptic functional beauty. When we ex-
plore a functional object with the hands and fingertips, for example, we often describe its 
feel in aesthetic terms. We say that it is aesthetically satisfying to weigh the perfect snow-
ball in one’s hand, to depress the keys of a vintage typewriter or grand piano, to feel the 
elegant swish of a well-balanced baseball bat. We speak of the aesthetic pleasure that comes 
with handling one’s glossy, state-of-the-art laptop, or with operating a carefully restored 
antique sewing machine. And although there are some aesthetic attributes, such as hand-
some or resplendent, that may of necessity be restricted to the visual, we are more liberal with 
our use of the term beautiful. My new hiking boots, for example, can feel beautiful when 
I try them on and experience how well they support my ankle and grip the floor with their 
treads. A bicycle can be said not only to look beautiful, but to ride beautifully, where this is 
a matter of how it feels to the user.15 Aesthetic attributions such as these are not jarring or 
unnatural; they are an intelligible component of our ordinary aesthetic vocabulary.
We can say all this without the unwanted implication that simple tactile sensations 
are also appropriate subjects of aesthetic discourse because we have a way of drawing a 
principled distinction between agreeable sensations and the haptic perception of func-
tional beauty. The latter is a kind of pleasure that is taken in the form of a material object 
located outside of the body; typically, a pleasure in how well-formed that object feels for 
its function. Pleasures that are merely ‘of the body’, on the other hand, do not have this 
connection to the form of an external entity, and this explains our reluctance to describe 
them in aesthetic terms.
5. Conclusions
I have argued that it is possible to perceive an object’s functional beauty through the 
modality of haptic touch, and thus that this proximal sense ought to be admitted to the 
aesthetic domain. An object appears functionally beautiful to an observer who knows its 
purpose when it has features that are indicative of its ability to perform its job well; when 
it is an exemplar of its functional type, pared back to its essentials; or when it exhibits 
a pleasing disharmony of form that does not undermine its functionality. An object feels 
beautiful in this sense when its fittingness for function is manifested in haptically ac-
cessible properties such as shape and size, spatial distribution, flexibility, hardness, or 
heaviness; when it feels streamlined, clean, or free from encumbrance; or when there is a 
satisfying tension between two or more of its felt qualities.
Tom Roberts 
University of Exeter, UK
tom.roberts@exeter.ac.uk
15 It is likely that some of these examples will strike one as more plausible than others. Perhaps, for example, the 
feel of a simple household object such as a serving spoon ought never to be described as beautiful, no matter how 
fitting it seems for its function. I do not hope to persuade a critic otherwise, but we can observe that this is a 
challenge for the notion of functional beauty in general (can a spoon look functionally beautiful?) rather than for 
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